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STATE-CORPORATE CRIME IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A
CASE STUDY OF GENERAL DYNAMICS' PROCUREMENT
OF THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE

James E. Robinson, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2000

This study outlines the evolution of White-Collar criminological
studies of the 1940's, to the more specific study of State-Corporate in the
Defense Industry. Furthermore, it outlines the procurement process used
by the Department of Defense and puts these processes within a
theoretical framework to better explain how State-Corporate crimes occur.
This study focuses on the process by which billions of dollars are
wasted each year within the military procurement process, and
specifically outlines the fraudulent procurement practices utilized by the
General Dynamics Corporation when it built the Trident Submarine
during the 1970's.
This study also explains the concept of the Military Industrial
Complex and the powerful actors within this entity that perpetuate State
Corporate crime in the Defense Industry.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades a number of criminologists have
conducted research on the topic of organizational crime. Some of these
studies focus on corporate crime (Clinard and Yeager, 1978; Kramer,
1984; and Michalowski and Kramer, 1987), some on government crime
(Roebuck and Weeber, 1978; Glaser and Possony, 1979; and Kauzlarich,
Kramer, and Smith, 1992), and still others on state-corporate crime: crime
that is the result of the interaction between governments and corporations
(Kramer and Michalowski, 1990; Kramer, 1992; and Kauzlarich and
Kramer, 1992). One major industry that has been neglected, however, is
the defense industry. This thesis will begin to explore state-corporate
crime in the defense industry in the United States. Specifically, I will
present a case study of the illegal acts committed by the General
Dynamics Corporation during the procurement process of the Trident
nuclear submarine.
While scholarly neglect towards this topic alone justifies the study,
there are other social and political reasons why this research is important
and timely. For instance, the description and explanation of criminal
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fraud and abuse in the defense procurement process may help to foster
reforms in that process and eliminate wasteful military spending.
Furthermore, throughout most of the twentieth century the world saw
only a handful of powerful nations. Subsequently, the Soviet Union and
the United States emerged as world leaders while advancing their
ideologies (Communism and Democracy) throughout this period. During
the cold-war era (after the conclusion of World War II and prior to the fall
of the Berlin Wall which had separated Communist, East Germany and
Democratic, West Germany) these two countries wielded economic,
political, and military power over the rest of the world - clearly the
forerunners within their respective ideologies: However, in the post cold
war era (since the demise of Communism and the fall of the Berlin wall)
the United States military has slowly redefined the role of American
fighting men and women stationed throughout the world. Today's U.S.
fighting forces no longer train to fight and win a major war with the
Soviet Union, their former nemesis. Rather, the United States is training
to respond to several lessor engagements simultaneously. Throughout
this period, however, the United States fighting forces have dwindled in
size to pre-Viet Nam era (1960's) numbers, all the while significantly
increasing the operations tempo while responding to crises throughout the
world. Likewise, throughout this same period the United States armed

forces have seen a dwindling budget due to cut-backs in the President's
budget for the military. These budget cuts have affected research and
development for newer equipment, the ability of military personnel to
receive training with both high-tech and older equipment, as well as
significantly hampering the ability to procure spare parts for aging
equipment. With the decreasing number of military personnel, the
increased operations tempo, and less_of a budget to properly equip and
train the United States fighting forces, it is imperative that the
Department of Defense significantly reduce the amount of money which is
wasted within their procurement processes.
There are four major research objectives that guide this thesis: (1)
To provide an introduction to the nature and extent of state-corporate
crime in the defense industry; (2) To describe the criminal acts committed
by General Dynamics throughout, and after, the procurement of the
Trident nuclear submarine; (3) To place the actions of General Dynamics
within a theoretical framework that allows us to identify and analyze the
historical, structural, and organizational forces that shaped these crimes;
and (4) To outline policy changes that may reduce the incidence of these
types of state-corporate crimes.
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From White-Collar Crime to State-Corporate Crime

The concept of white-collar crime was first developed by Edwin
Sutherland in 1939. He argued that people within the upper classes
committed crimes, even though these crimes were not the focus of
traditional criminological study.
Sutherland's ideas on white-collar crime eventually sparked much
discussion and debate within the realm of criminological study.
Unfortunately, it wasn't until the 1970's that criminologists refocused
their attention towards "white-collar" crime. Clinard and Quinney (1973)
were two such individuals credited with refining Sutherland's ideas in
their work Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology. They did this by
outlining the importance of one's occupation in the commission of white
collar crime and suggesting white-collar crime is two-fold: occupational or
corporate. According to Clinard and Quinney (1973), "Occupational Crime
consists of offenses committed by individuals for themselves in the course
of their occupations and the offenses of employees against their
employers" (p. 188). Corporate crime is defined as, "the offenses
committed by corporate officials for their corporation and the offenses of
the corporation itself' (p. 188).
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Clinard and Quinney identified an important concept to which
many sociologist have dedicated much attention - the corporation. By
recognizing the important role a corporation plays in white-collar crime
they initiated sociological study at the organizational level of analysis.
Schrager and Short continued Clinard and Quinney's refinement of
Sutherland's ideas by succinctly outlining deficiencies in Sutherland's
differential association concept. Th�y contend (1978), "preoccupation with
individuals can lead us to underestimate the pressures within society and
organizational structures which impel those individuals to commit illegal
acts" (p. 410). Furthermore,
These difficulties make necessary and possible the
analysis of organizations as potentially criminal agents.
Recognizing that structural forces influence the
commission of these offenses does not negate the
importance of interaction between individuals and these
forces, nor does it deny that individuals are involved in
the commission of illegal organizational acts. It serves to
emphasize organizational as opposed to individual
etiological factors, and calls for a macrosociological rather
than an individual level of explanation (p. 410).
The organizational perspective, therefore, argues that the
organizational structure influences actors within the organization in such
a way that it places significant pressures upon these actors. These
pressures ultimately lead to corporate wrongdoing.

6
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) further refined the study of white
collar crime with the concept of state-corporate crime. They define statecorporate crime as:
(I)llegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or
more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in
direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic
production and distribution (p.3).
As Friedrichs (1995) points out, "(t)he premise for the concept of
state-corporate crime is that modern· states and corporations are
profoundly interdependent" (p. 154). The facilitation of NASA and the
Morton Thiokol corporation with regards to the space shuttle Challenger
disaster in 1986 is just one example which clearly demonstrates the
intricacies of state-corporate crime. Furthermore, without each of the
actors in both of these instances, these crimes, and the deaths which
resulted, would not have occurred.
Aulette and Michalowski (1993) further define state-corporate
crime by classifying it as either state facilitated, or state initiated. State
facilitated crimes are those which the state, either by its actions or
omissions, advances the progress of the crime which was initiated by
another entity. State-initiated crimes, simply put, are those crimes which
are started by the State.

7
State Corporate Crime in the Defense Industry

By adding a military component to a state-corporate crime, a more
specific type of state-corporate crime emerges. This type of crime is called
state-corporate crime in the defense industry.
State-corporate crime in the defense industry includes at least
three powerful agencies: the State (Congress), the Department of Defense
(military), and a Corporation (General Dynamics). The collaboration
between these three entities is known as the "military-industrial
complex." The interaction between the members of the military industrial
complex is both complex and interdependent. Each of the members
benefits from this collaboration, either through profits, power, weapons,
funding, or future jobs. Through this association, the military industrial
complex has both initiated and facilitated an atmosphere of
organizational misconduct that permeates the entire industry.
Many types of crimes are committed in the defense industry. In
addition to fraud, additional crimes occur such as bribery, bid rigging,
''buying-in", illegal charging to government bills, racketeering, extortion,
and conspiracy. However, two of these crimes (bid rigging and buying-in)
are probably two crimes that require some explanation. Whereas most
people may be familiar with crimes such as fraud, charging the
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government illegally, or extortion, bid rigging and buying-in are types of
crimes that are predominantly found when the government procures a
service or other item from a business or corporation. The procurement
process in the defense industry is an area where these two types of crimes
flourish, therefore requiring some explanation.
Bid rigging is the practice of submitting a bid for a contract after
having already secured "inside" knowledge of the bids that others were
going to submit for consideration. Having this type of "inside" knowledge,
the corporation is virtually guaranteed to win the contract. Another type
of bid rigging is when representatives from separate corporations take
turns submitting the lowest bid. This bid, although the lowest, still
results in a substantial profit because it is well above what the bidder
would have submitted had s/he not known what the others were going to
bid. With this type of bid rigging each of the participants takes its turn at
submitting the '1ow" bid, and subsequently reaping the financial benefits
that accompany the bid.
Buying-in is the practice of submitting a bid known by the
contractor to be much lower than what it would cost to actually produce
the product. By doing this the contractor is assured of being awarded the
contract. Later, during the process of building the product, the
corporation announces it will cost more than expected and needs more
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money to finish the contract. This not only assures the corporation is
awarded the contract, but ensures a healthy profit too.
There is, however, more to buying-in than just getting the initial
contract and going back to the Department of Defense for more money. If
a corporation receives an initial contract for a newly-desired weapons
system, the corporation is virtually guaranteed to receive the lucrative
follow-on contracts that will surely follow. "Obviously the contractor,
knowing that all he has to do is win the first competition, thereby
capturing all the follow-on contracts, will not be encouraged to keep costs
down."(Rasor, 1985, p. 128).
To compound this problem, the vast majority of government
contracts are not even competitively bid. As Rasor(1985) notes,
"According to the General Accounting Office(GAO), in 1981 only 6 percent
of the Pentagon's procurement budget was competitively bid ... "(p. 128).
Competitively bidding is the process of requiring many separate
contractors to compete for contracts the government is offering. In the
instance of the procurement of the Trident nuclear submarine, the
Electric Boat Division of the General Dynamics Corporation was the only
contractor allowed to bid on the contract.
Buying-in is probably the most difficult crime to prove as it relates
to the defense industry. The items the Department of Defense purchases

10
are very high-tech, often very secretive, and are believed to be very
expensive due to the precision needed for them to operate on battlefields
in the roughest climates and terrains. Furthermore, these items are
predominantly newly-designed weapons which are being built to meet the
evolving needs of the Department of Defense. Therefore when a
corporation tells the Department of Defense that it will cost a billion
dollars to make a weapon, due to the technical complexity of the weapon
system, it is difficult to determine if the cost to produce the weapon
system is legitimate.
Examples of likely buying-in to government contracts are not hard
to find. In 1977 the United States Army procured the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle at a cost of $338,000. Although the Army assured Congress this
price was firm, by 1982 the actual cost had exploded to $1.94 million each
(Rasor, 1983, p. 14).
The Wall Street Journal's Alexander Cockburn wrote an article in
1981 condemning the Air Force's procurement of the AWACS aircraft.
More than a decade after starting production the cost for 35 AWACS
aircraft had cost the United States Air Force nine billion dollars.
"Unofficial predictions are that the $9 billion figure will double by the
time the program is completed" (Rasor, 1983, p. 126). Furthermore,
"when Pentagon analyst A. Ernest Fitzgerald revealed to Congress in
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1969 that the C-5a was over budget by $2 billion, it was then the biggest
cost overrun ever recorded" (Rasor, 1983, p. 251).
Examples like these permeate the defense industry's procurement
system, and are made possible by the involvement of the Military
Industrial Complex. Through these complex relationships, crimes like
these will continue and American tax dollars will be wasted.

Theories of Org.anizational Crime

There are three main theories which attempt to explain
organizational crime: Social psychological, organizational, and political
economy. Each of these theories is discussed below.
Social psychological, or differential association theory, explains
deviant corporate acts as being a result of associations between persons
within organizations that perpetuate criminal behavior. By associating
oneself with others who condone, or promote, deviant acts, a person is
likely to commit the actions that s/he learned - whether deviant or not.
This theory has received much criticism, as many contend that using the
individual as the unit of analysis is problematic. Rather, many
criminologists argue that corporate crime is organizational crime and its
explanation calls for an organizational level of analysis. "Preoccupation
with individuals can lead us to underestimate the pressures within

12
society and organizational structure, which impel those individuals to
commit illegal acts" (Schrager and Short, 1978, p. 410).
The organizational perspective argues that the organizational
structure influences actors within the organization in such a way that it
places significant pressures upon these actors to -commit corporate
wrongdoing. As Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998, p. 145) observe,
"Organizations ... are strongly goal oriented and concerned with
performance, while norms governing the means to achieve these goals
may be weak or absent."
Two other factors which may influence organizational crime are
available means and lacking social controls. Braithwaite (1989) also
contends that the prosperity of organizational wrongdoing is contingent
upon illegal means being available to the organization, while Finney and
Lesieur (1982, p. 275) contend that, "whether or not a strong performance
orientation and operating problems lead to crime depends also on the
operationality of various social controls."
The political economy perspective argues that corporations exist
within the framework of the larger social structure. Those who adopt this
perspective contend that corporate crime is shaped by patterns of
economic organization and the distribution of political power.
Furthermore, the unique structural features of corporate capitalism and
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the pressures for capital accumulation are theorized as causal factors
leading to corporate crime. Although similar to the organizational theory,
"the critical difference is the way in which the political economy
perspective stresses the shaping and constraining influence of the broader
historical, institutional structure of society on organizational behavior"
(Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998, p. 147)
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) offer an integrated framework for
studying organizational crime which associates social-psychological,
organizational, and structural level theories, with three catalysts for
action: motivation or performance emphasis, opportunity structure, and
the operationality of social control. According to Kauzlarich and Kramer
(1998):
The framework is based on the proposition that criminal
behavior at the organizational level results from a coincidence
of pressure for goal attainment, availability and perceived
attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an absence or
weakness of social control mechanisms (p. 148).
Organization managers must be motivated to utilize corporate
wrongdoing as a means of achieving organizational goals. However,
without the opportunity to achieve legitimate goals, motivated
organization managers may choose to use illegal means. Furthermore,
"even if legal means are available, agents may still decide to use illegal
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means in the pursuit of their goals if the norms or cultural definitions of
the organization support them" (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998, p. 150).
Social control mechanisms are the final piece of the integrated
framework. Specifically, "social forces exist at all three levels of analysis,
exerting pressure on organizations and organizational actors and
checking their efforts to select illegal means to goal attainment"
(Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998, p. 151). Weak or absent social control
mechanisms may allow an atmosphere where corporate wrongdoing can
flourish.
A wide range of social controls exist at the structural level, such as
legal sanctions, public opinion, mass media, social movement
organizations, or watchdog groups (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).
"Internal cultures of compliance may regulate the behavior of
organizational actors" at the organizational level, while "strong ethical
standards may be an important bulwark against involvement in
opportunities for organizational crime" at the individual level (Kauzlarich
and Kramer, 1998).

Methods

For this research project, a case study design will be used. A case
study design typically provides a complete and detailed account or
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description of a particular phenomenon, along with a careful and
systematic analysis of that phenomenon. Such a qualitative case study is
thought to be the best way to advance our understanding of corporate
crime as a social phenomenon. According to Stakes (1995, p. xi) the case
study is"... the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case,
coming to understand its activity within important circumstances."
Furthermore, Merriam (1998, p. 34) describes the case study as"... an
intensive, holistic description and analysis of a single entity, phenomenon
or social unit." In this research, state-corporate crime in the defense
industry (as related to the General Dynamics Corporation) is the"case" to
be studied.

Case Study Strengths

There are many arguments in support of this type of method. Case
studies allow the researcher to study ''human events and actions in their
natural surrounding'' and"to ground the observations and concepts with
which she or he works" (Feagin, Orum, Sjoberg, 1991, p. 7). This allows
for a very detailed and in-depth study. Additionally, because the case
study examines people in their natural settings it"permits the observer to
render social action in a manner that comes closest to the action as it is
understood by the actors themselves" (Feagin et. al., 1991, p. 8).

Another advantage of case studies is they study a phenomenon in
its entirety. This allows researchers to advance empirically and
theoretically by understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions,
and motives. Whereas quantitative methods are very shallow in their
depth, case studies allow researchers to better understand the
complexities of the phenomenon; complexities such as the impact of beliefs
and decisions, effects of decisions, sense of actors motives behind
decisions, and how humans develop definitions of the situation (Feagin et.
al., 1991). Feagin et. al. (1991) contend that:
the advantage of case studies (as we perceive them) is that
researchers who utilize them can deal with the reality behind
appearances, with contradictions and the dialectical nature of
social life, as well as with a whole that is more than the sum of
its parts. The case study approach that takes into account
these kinds of assumptions can ... provide us with fundamental
sociological knowledge of human agents, communities,
organizations, nation-states, empires, and civilizations. (p. 39)
Furthermore, as Braithwaite (1984) observes:
My view is that statistical studies are perhaps as premature
today as they were when Sutherland undertook the first
statistical study of corporate crime. Without a qualitative
understanding of the contours of corporate crimes and how they
unfold, we cannot begin to comprehend what lies behind the
quantitative descriptions (p.7).
Additionally, case studies "enable a researcher to examine the ebb
and flow of social life over time and to display the patterns of everyday
life as they change" (Feagin et. al., 1991, p. 12). Case studies also allow
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for the development of new theory. By using a case study method, one is
able to challenge existing theory and, more importantly, expand areas of
existing research as Edwin Sutherland did with his study of white collar
cnme.
On theoretical and empirical grounds, a case can be made that
various major organizational issues cannot be addressed until
in-depth case studies come to be viewed as not just an adjunct
to the natural science model but as having an independent role
of their own in advancing sociological principles regarding
bureaucratic structures (Feagin et al., 1991, p. 55).
Organizations within our society are very powerful, and as such
they are very difficult to study without using the case study approach.
''Many social researchers lament, directly or indirectly, the fact that
powerful organizational elites are uncooperative, but they fail to realize
that secrecy is a fundamental means of sustaining power and influence"
(Feagin et al., 1991, p. 56). The secrecy and power that organizations
have shields them from sociological scrutiny. However, by using a case
study many undesirable activities undertaken by organizations can be
unveiled.

Case Study Weaknesses

The first criticism of qualitative methods is that they are not able to
show how two separate phenomena are related without examining several
different instances in which both phenomena are present. Therefore the
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researcher isn't able to show that the connection between the two is real
(Feagin et al. 1991). Although this criticism is well noted, it isn't as
problematic as it seems. According to Feagin et al. (1991), "sometimes the
study of a single case, which is construed to be a deviant case, may help to
illuminate how the more general social process under discussion works"
(p.16). 1 Also, a researcher is able to bypass this problem by comparing the
results of several case studies to each other. Glaser and Strauss
successfully show this in their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory.
The validity of documents may be problematic too (Yin, 1994). Yin
reminds us that documents are not written for the researcher, therefore,
scrutinizing the document's proposed legitimacy is crucial. Likewise, the
writer's motive for writing the document may lead to bias too. A
Republican critique of a Democratic presidential candidate could
highlight the importance of knowing a writer's motive. Subsequently, it's
important to understand both whom the document was produced for, as
well as whom the document was produced by, as both weigh heavily on
the reliability and validity of a document.

Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman, Union
Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical
Union (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956) 10
1
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Data Collection

Data for this case study are of two types and have been collected
from a variety of sources. The data consist of documentary materials
(such as public records and reports), legal documents, and journalistic
accounts. The major sources of data include the following:
1.

Reports by the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense

Management (The Packard Commission). The Final Report of the
Packard Commission and their report Conduct and Accountability was
obtained. These reports contain numerous appendices which are various
private sector reports and surveys on the defense industry.
2.

Reports from the Inspector General of the Pentagon. The

Pentagon's own Inspector General has carried out several audits and
investigations that shed some light on the misconduct of defense firms.
These reports were obtained from the Pentagon.
3.

General Accounting Office (GAO) Audits. The GAO, the

investigative arm of Congress, has also audited defense contracts on
several occasions uncovering various illegalities. These GAO audits are
used.
4.

Congressional Committee Investigations. A number of

Congressional Committees have held hearings and conducted
investigations concerning wrongdoing within the defense contracting

system. Reports from the following Congressional Committees are used:
(a) Investigative Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
and (b) Senate Armed Services Committee.
5.

Investor Responsibility Research Center. The Investor

Responsibility Research Center in Washington DC, developed a book
entitled, Stocking The Arsenal: A Guide to the Nations Top Military
Contractors. This book provides detailed information on the defense
programs of all of the country's largest investor-owned defense
contractors.
6.

Journalistic Accounts. A major source of data comes from

newspapers, magazines, journals, and books. Journalistic accounts of
illegal acts by defense contractors have been collected from the New York
Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Time, �ewsweek, Nation,
the various business magazines, trade journals, and books on the defense
industry.
7.

The Project on Military Procurement. The Project on Military

Procurement is a private, non-profit organization whose goals are to make
the public, the press, and Congress aware of the fraud, waste, and abuse
in the military budget, and to reform the Pentagon procurement system.
Two separate books from Dina Razor, the founder of The Project on

20

Military Procurement, provide valuable insight into the culture of defense
industry procurement.
8.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Briefs. Briefs

from the Congressional Research Service that outline necessary reforms
needed within the defense procurement system, and summarize alleged
fraud, waste, and abuse by the General Dynamics Corporation are used.

Overview

Chapter II, The Trident Submarine Procurement: A Case Study,
describes the procurement process that was followed by the General
Dynamics Corporation when they received the contract from the
Department of Defense to build the first Ohio class nuclear-powered
Trident ballistic missile submarine at a cost of $1.5 billion. The case
study describes the involvement of General Dynamics, Takis Veliotis (the
former general manager of the Electric Boat Division of General
Dynamics), and Admiral Hyman Rickover (the former head of the Navy's
shipbuilding program) as they each participated in the frauds
surrounding the procurement of this lucrative contract.
Chapter III, State-Corporate Crime in the Defense Industry: An

Analysis, analyzes the procurement process and the military industrial

21

complex to explain why the crimes surrounding the procurement of the
Trident submarine occurred.
Chapter IV, Summary and Conclusion, briefly summarizes the
methods I used to complete this case study and the findings. This chapter
also gives a general conclusion, provides policy recommendations,
discusses limitations of the study, and discusses ideas for future research
on state-corporate crime in the defense industry.
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CHAPTER II

THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT: A CASE STUDY

Who else can record the largest loss in history, over five
billion for tax purposes, at the same time record a two
billion-dollar profit for SEC purposes, and still pay no federal
income taxes since 1972?
Who else can buy in on a major defense contract, do a
miserable job of managing the construction of the weapon
system, overrun fixed-priced contracts by one billion dollars,
be willing to settle a claim against the government for one
hundred and fifty million dollars, and later receive close to
one billion dollars in taxpayers' money?
Who else could use non-conforming steel in a submarine,
foul up the welding program, suffer a total collapse of its
quality control program, make a preposterous claim against
the Navy insurance process, and then obtain another
government bail-out?
What small contractor could suffer the wrath of the
Secretary of the Navy, go to the White House and meet with
Mr. Meese, then have a pleasant meeting with the Secretary
of the Navy that results in the Assistant Secretary running
out to your corporate limousine like a puppy dog to assure
you that the Navy will take care of you? And where else can
the Assistant Secretary get hired eighteen months later as
an executive vice president? Mr. Chairman, the questions
continue.
(Congressman Gerry Silorski of
Minnesota addressing General Dynamics
Chairman of the Board David S. Lewis
during a 1985 Congressional Hearing.)
General Dynamics has been a major contributor to the phenomenon
of state-corporate crime in the defense industry. For the past twenty-five
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years General Dynamics has been repeatedly investigated for criminal
behaviors. However, of the many questionable activities General
Dynamics has been involved with, their procurement of nuclear-powered
attack and Trident ballistic missile submarines has received the most
attention. The majority of the allegations revolved around three actors:
former general manager of the Electric Boat Division of General
Dynamics, Takis Veliotis; the former head of the Navy's nuclear-powered
shipbuilding program, Admiral Hyman Rickover; and the General
Dynamics Corporation itself.

Description of Event

The episode at the Electric Boat Division, like most instances of
crime at this level, was very complex. It all began when the Electric Boat
Division of the General Dynamics Corporation, between 1971 and 1973,
received contracts from the Navy to build 18 Los Angeles class nuclear
powered attack submarines at a cost of $665 million each. Additionally,
in 1974 Electric Boat received a contract for the first Ohio class nuclear
powered "Trident" ballistic missile submarine at a cost of $1.5 billion each
(O'Rourke, 1985). However, by 1976 neither contract was on schedule and
both were producing cost overruns of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Consequently, both the Electric Boat Division and the United States Navy
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were accusing each other for the dismal state of affairs. According to
O'Rourke, 1985, "The Navy placed the weight of the blame on
management problems at Electric Boat; Electric Boat placed the weight of
the blame on detailed plans supplied by the Navy and numerous design
changes ordered by the Navy once the ships were under construction" (p.
1). Electric Boat, charging lost revenue caused by the Navy's unnecessary
changes, filed a claim for reimbursement in the amount of $544 million.
And in December of 1977, exactly one year later, Electric Boat threatened
to file new claims that would raise the total claims to $843 million. Three
months later, in March of 1978, General Dynamics notified the Navy that
all work on the submarines at Electric Boat would be halted unless a
satisfactory agreement could be reached. After an extension was given on
the original deadline, the Navy and Electric Boat reached an agreement
(O'Rourke, 1985).
The $843 million claim that Electric Boat threatened to file was the
figure used for the settlement. As a condition of the agreement Electric
Boat was awarded $125 million of the $843 million. The remaining $718
million was to be divided equally between Electric Boat and the Navy in
the form of an absorbed $359 million loss over 6 years by Electric Boat,
while the Navy would pay Electric Boat the remaining $359 million.
Additionally, 50% of any additional cost overruns, up to $50 million,

would be paid by the Navy and up to another $100 million in inflationary
cost overruns (O'Rourke, 1985). The final cost to the Navy, either paid or
obligated to pay to Electric Boat, was $634 million. This sum was 75% of
the threatened $843 million reimbursement claim, or an incredible 116%
of the actual claim filed by Electric Boat.
Up to this point the Navy had not accused General Dynamics, or its
subsidiary Electric Boat of any cri�inal violations. However, in Jan�ary
of 1979 the Justice Department opened an investigation regarding
possible fraudulent claims made by Electric Boat. Although General
Dynamics Chairman David Lewis insisted their claims were thoroughly
documented and that their "[i]dea of fraud is, I think, absurd" (Anderson,
1984, p. 61), the accusations continued. According to Vice Admiral Earl
B. Fowler, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, "faulty welds and
inferior steel had 'significantly delayed' construction of the subs and
increased the cost" and ''he characterized the standard of workmanship as
"'

'shocking (O'Rourke, 1985, p.2). This prompted Navy Secretary John
Lehman to remove three submarine contracts from competitive bids and
award them on a sole source basis to Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company of Newport News, Virginia. Subsequently the general
manager of Electric Boat, Takis Veliotis, testified before the Seapower
Subcommittee that "Navy designers and inspectors, and Navy-furnished

26

27
equipment, were to blame for the construction delays" along with "a 1arge
volume' of design changes ordered by the Navy once the boats were under
construction" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 3).
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger denounced Electric Boat
for its workmanship and less than a month later.the Navy announced
that it would not award the next Trident contract to Electric Boat, even
though they had received the contracts for the previous eight.
Surprisingly though, after Veliotis warned the Senate Appropriations on
Defense subcommittee that "switching submarine work to Government
shipyards would erode the private industrial base and complicate naval
shipbuilding" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 3), the Navy changed its mind. Less
than a month after its original statement that it would not award the
Trident contract to Electric Boat they issued a report stating "most of
Electric Boat's problems had been solved and that the firm was capable of
building both Tridents and attack submarines" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 3).
From this point forward the relationship between Electric Boat and
the Navy soured. Admiral Rickover again blasted Electric Boat "for their
'ruthless money-making schemes' and of subverting competition by
submitting unrealistically low bids and then raising the price of the ships
once the contracts were awarded'' (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 3) Two months
later on June 19, 1981, Secretary of the Navy Lehman accused Electric

Boat of "filing 'rip-off and 'preposterous' claims to gain reimbursement for
their own faulty work" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 3) After official denials of the
accusations, Electric Boat started campaigning to undermine Admiral
Rickover, who was a constant thorn in Electric Boat's side. Rickover, who
was Veliotis' nemesis, was "privately" accused by. Electric Boat of
"jeopardizing the safety of two subs during sea trials by failing to issue
the proper commands" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 4). Two months later the Navy
and General Dynamics reconciled "as a result of the efforts of General
Dynamics and the Navy" (O'Rourke, 1985, p.4). The reconciliation was
directly related to the Navy's decision to retire Admiral Rickover and
General Dynamics decision to promote Veliotis to executive vice president
of General Dynamics, a position not directly in control of the Electric Boat
Division. By December of 1981 the Justice Department closed its
investigation of Electric Boat without filing charges.
It appeared as though General Dynamics had side-stepped the
Navy and Justice Department. However, in 1983 a Federal Grand Jury
indicted, among other people, Veliotis for racketeering, conspiracy, filing
false and fraudulent claims against the government, and bankruptcy
fraud. Veliotis preempted the indictment by fleeing to Greece, his
homeland, only to see General Dynamics quickly turn on him. Within a
week of the indictment (September 14, 1983) General Dynamics
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attempted to recover $8 million in damages from Veliotis, and the other
three who were indicted with him, by filing suit in Federal Court in
Delaware. General Dynamics contended the $8 million would cover the
damages of the conspiracy to defraud the company that Veliotis and his
associates had perpetuated (O'Rourke, 1985).
Veliotis soon realized a reconciliation with General Dynamics was
impossible. In direct contradiction to previous statements involving the
18 submarine contracts of Electric Boat, Veliotis was now charging
General Dynamics "submitted unrealistically low bids for the attack
submarines, then filed fraudulent claims to make up the difference"
(O'Rourke, 1985, p.4). After making a deal with the Justice Department
for limited immunity, Veliotis spoke with federal officials and handed
over documents. Although Veliotis had certainly hurt General Dynamics
by turning states evidence against them, it appeared, at least at this
point, that General Dynamics had gotten the better of Veliotis. Not only
was Veliotis a fugitive in Greece, but General Dynamics also froze his
69,659 shares of General Dynamics stock. However, a year later Veliotis
had made public two audio cassettes that directly implicated General
Dynamics' chairman David Lewis for withholding internal corporate
estimates that were required to be released to the Security and Exchange
Commission (O'Rourke, 1985).
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General Dynamics had to fight off other accusations too. This time
claims surfaced that they bribed Admiral Rickover (their old nemesis)
with gifts totaling $67,628.33. Under Clause 54 of the Navy's attack
submarine contract with General Dynamics, termination of the contract is
authorized:
Upon a finding that gratuities (in the form of entertainment,
gifts, or otherwise) were offered or given by the contractor ...
to any officer or employee of the Government with a view
toward securing a contract or· securing favorable treatment
with respect to the awarding or amending, or the making of
any determination with respect to the performing of such
contracts; provided, that the existence of the facts upon
which the Secretary or his duly authorized representative
makes such finds shall be issued and may be reviewed in any
competent court (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 13).
Admiral Rickover was a career Navy man and somewhat of a
tyrant. For 17 years he supervised General Dynamics' construction of
nuclear weapons and although he was, at times, overbearing and
intimidating, ''his faults ... were outweighed by his readiness to denounce
rip-offs by the big contractors and seriousness with which his
pronouncements were received on Capitol Hill" (Fitzgerald, 1989, p. 194).
General Dynamics, as it would later be discovered, was fully aware of
Admiral Rickover's loyalties and from the very start of his 17 year
supervision of them, they began constructing a snare that would
eventually trap him. A few of the items General Dynamics documented
were:
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Miscellaneous commemorative items, such as mint
julep cups and silver trays; estimated value
$19,183.54.
Chauffeur services, including driving Admiral
Rickover and his son to a New England boy's camp;
estimated cost $16,387.13.
An assortment of food and other amenities.supplied for
Admiral Rickover's use during sea trials, including
fresh fish, books, fruit, electric toothbrushes, and
candy; estimated value $12,000.
(Biddle, 1985, p. 13)
Although Lewis stated that "nothing was ever given to Admiral
Rickover with an intent to obtain a contract or to secure favorable
determination" (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 14), the Navy fined General Dynamics
ten times the amount of the gifts (the maximum allowed by federal law)
which amounted to $676,283.30. Furthermore, according to O'Rourke
(1985) "the Navy was: (1) suspending the Electric Boat and Pomona, CA
divisions of General Dynamics from all new contracts; [and] (2) canceling
$22.5 million in contracts held by the two divisions... " (p. 11).
Additionally the Navy stated it would not lift the suspension until
"General Dynamics: (1) established a code of ethics for its employees; (2)
certified the validity of outstanding overhead billings; and (3) resolved
$75 million in disputed overhead billings with the Navy" (O'Rourke, 1985,
p. 12).
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Shortly thereafter, in July of 1985, the ban was lifted and Electric
Boat,
was awarded a $616 million contract for the basic hull of the 12th
Trident and an important $28 million contract for preliminary
design work on the SSN-21, the Navy's proposed new attack
submarine. Another $400 million in contr.acts would be awarded
'very soon' (O'Rourke, 1985, p. 13).
The sequence of events listed below in Figure 1 was detrimental to
the American public. Although nol?ody was killed or maimed due to these
crimes, the American public's trust in military contractors and the
government was severely damaged. Consistently, the Navy allowed
General Dynamics and Electric Boat to circumvent prosecution for illegal
acts they committed. Also, the minimal fines General Dynamics and
Electric Boat did occasionally pay were paltry compared to the amount of
money they made from their illegal activity. Additionally, the :financial
cost American taxpayers had to endure was incredible. With contracts
reaching hundreds of millions of dollars, the hardships sustained due to
the bid-rigging schemes proved to be astronomical.
For at least 25 years, and probably longer, General Dynamics and
Electric Boat defrauded the government of billions of dollars. In addition
to fraud, General Dynamics committed additional crimes such as bribery,
bid rigging, ''buying-in", illegal charges to government bills, racketeering,
extortion, and conspiracy. All of these acts are criminal offenses,
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Between 71'- 73' EB contracts with Navy
to build 18 LA Class nuclear powered
attack subs.
7/74 - EB receives 1st
Ohio class Trident
submarine contract.
3/76 - Both contracts are behind
schedule and producing significant cost
overruns.
12/76 - EB files a claim against the
Navy for reimbursement of $544 million
lost due to Navy order changes.

12/77 - EB threatens to
file new claims
totaling $844 million.

-�
3/78 - GD notifies the Navy that all
work on the submarine contracts would be
halted unless an agreement was reached
on the reimbursement claims.
6/78 - An agreement is reached between
GD and the Navy where the Navy pays 118%
of the claim that was filed.

3/81 - Navy Secretary Lehman removes 3
submarine contracts from competitive
bids and awards them to Newport News
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company.

3/81 - EB General Manager, Takis
Veliotis, testifies against the Navy.

4/81 - Navy announces won't award next
Trident contract to EB.
4/81 - Navy reverses its decision and
awards the Trident contract to EB.

4/81 - Admiral Rickover again accuses EB
of illegal activities.
6/81 - Secretary of Navy (Lehman)
accuses EB of illegal activities.
7/81 - Admiral Rickover accused of
endangering the safety of 2 submarines
10/81 -Navy retires ADM Rickover and GD
promotes Veliotis to Executive VP of GD.
12/81 - DOJ closes investigation of EB

without filing charges.

Figure 1. General Dynamics Order of Events.

1/79 - Investigation of
GD opened by the
Justice Department
(DOJ) after Admiral
Rickover alleges the EB
made fraudulent claims
in regards to their
submarine contracts.

7/83 - Veliotis flees
to Greece.

9/83 - Federal Grand
Jury indicts Veliotis
for racketeering,
conspiracy, filing
false & fraudulent
claims against the
government, and
bankruptcy fraud.
9/83 - GD files suit
against Veliotis to
recover $8 million in
damages.

7/85 - Ban lifted.
Electric Boat awarded
$616 million contract.

34
however, none of the actors listed above spent a day in prison because of
their illegal actions. Furthermore, I contend American military personnel
were victimized twice: once as taxpayers who had, and still have to, pay
for these crimes; and a second time because they were required, even
ordered, to use faulty equipment sold to the U.S. military services by
General Dynamics as quality merchandise. Most fraudulent claims made
by defense contractors are deliberate and intentional, and in the case of
other weapons systems not discussed here,

have maimed and killed those

who were obligated to use them for their safety.2
Undoubtedly this unacceptable situation (created by the U.S.
government, General Dynamics, and Electric Boat) was a collective act.
Although the three entities may not have deliberately conspired to create
this situation, their refusal to take measures to prevent it from occurring
makes them responsible for the current state of affairs in the defense

One of the most disgusting examples of fraudulent claims which
lead to the death of many soldiers during Viet Nam war was the
procurement of the AR-15 rifle. After the Army made three unneeded
design changes to the critically acclaimed AR-15, the once reliable,
accurate, and most lethal combat rifle of its era, became unreliable and
consistently malfunctioned. Many U.S. soldiers were killed by the Viet
Cong because the weapon malfunctioned on a consistent basis.
2

During the Viet Nam war, it was common practice for the Viet Cong
to strip U.S. soldiers of their equipment after killing them in combat. As
a testament of the weapons uselessness, the Viet Cong would rarely take
the M-16, as they too knew it was worthless (Fallows, 1981, pp. 85-101).
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industry. However, key personnel within General Dynamics and Electric
Boat did intentionally conspire to defraud the government, which was
amply documented. Additionally, a major deficiency within the checks
and balances in this industry is that the entities with the power to enforce
the laws, thus ensuring illegal activity is thwarted, do not subject the
actors to the punishment they deserve. Consistently, as top level
executives were accused of crimes, the government refused to either
enforce the law properly, or adhere to the punishments they issued.
An example of government unwillingness to take these crimes
seriously was the creation of the Packard Commission. On the surface it
would appear that, by creating this commission, the government was
serious about cleaning up the procurement process in the defense
industry. However, the Packard Commission did not establish any
standards with any ''bite" to them. Instead the Commission initiated the
following codes:
1. Each company will have and adhere to a written code of
business ethics and conduct.
2. The company's code establishes the high values expected
of its employees and the standard by which they must judge
their own conduct and that of their organization; each
company will train its employees concerning their personal
responsibilities under the code.
3. Each company will create a free and open atmosphere
that allows and encourages employees to report violations of
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its code to the company without fear of retribution for such
reporting.
4. Each company has the obligation to selfgovern by
monitoring compliance with federal procurement laws and
adopting procedures for voluntary disclosure of violations of
federal procurement laws and corrective actions taken.
5. Each company has a responsibility to each of the other
companies in the industry to live by standards of conduct
that preserve the integrity of the defense industry.
6. Each company must have public accountability for its
commitment to these principles.
(Kurland, 1993, p. 138)
This code is an obvious attempt to sidestep the heart of the
problem. Mr. Packard, the founder and then chairman of Hewlett
Packard, used words like responsibility, obligation, and integrity, as if the
corporations within the defense industry knew what these words meant.
Mr. Packard did not set any guidelines for punishment or even attempt to
get tough with violators of the law. As a matter of fact, the corporations
were not even required to sign the Defense Industry Initiative (DII).
According to Fitzgerald (1989), "He [Packard] didn't want them to be held
responsible for their past sins, just for crimes in progress. It was like
arguing that crooks should be punished only while they were actually
stealing, mugging, or raping'' (p. 231).
These types of crime are clearly organizational crimes. Although
Veliotis and others within General Dynamics certainly made a lot of
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money from their illegal activities, they were advancing the profitability
of the corporation too. Additionally, they each benefited financially
because of all the stock they owned in the company. According to Veliotis'
statements to Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes,
Chairman David Lewis, before he pressured the Navy into paying
up, lied to the Congress and to his own stockholders about how
much money the company was losing on the submarine program.
Lewis lied ... to keep General Dynamics stock from sliding'' (p. 2).
General Dynamics defrauded the government by underbidding their
contracts and then filing false claims against the government to make up
for their low bids. They also extorted the government by threatening to
cancel the submarine program, for which they were the only company in
the U.S. that could complete this contract, therefore putting the national
defense of this country at risk. They also committed perjury, while at the
same time putting the lives of service men and women at risk by
delivering weapons systems they knew were faulty.
Admiral Rickover was not legally guilty of breaking any criminal
laws, although he broke ethical standards by accepting thousands of
dollars worth of gifts from Veliotis and General Dynamics. His actions
were questionable and gave the perception of illegality which eroded the
confidence the American taxpayers and his superiors had in him.
Unfortunately, this type of situation occurs all too often.
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In sum, the actors in this scandal committed criminal and unethical
acts. Bribery, fraud, bid-rigging, and the filing of false claims were the
crimes committed by the actors in this case study.

CHAPTER III

STATE-CORPORATE CRIME IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY:
AN ANALYSIS

State-corporate crime in the defense industry is a neglected topic
within the overall study of crime in the United States. This chapter will
outline the procurement process used to buy weapons systems, and the
concept of the military industrial complex. Understanding these two
topics will help explain why the crimes described in chapter II occurred.

Procurement Process

The procurement process itself is a casual factor contributing to
fraudulent activities within the defense industry. According to Rasor
(1985), "[t]he key to the problems at the Pentagon is procurement ..." (p.
116). The process is full of red tape and complexity and goes through
phases of development.
After receiving congressional approval to build a weapon, an armed
service selects a program manager. This manager establishes a staff of
200-500 personnel within the research and development arena of the
armed service. At certain points determined by the armed service, the
decision to proceed further in the process is made.
39
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Phase I signifies the initiation of the program, while advanced
development, or termination of the process, is decided at Phase II. Once
approved at Phase II, it's virtually impossible to cancel the process.
Redesigning and testing of prototypes is accomplished between Phases II
and III. And finally, at Phase III, the decision whether to initiate further
research and development, and limited production, or to begin full
production of the weapon system is decided. All of the decisions to
proceed to subsequent phases are made by committees within the
appropriate command and reviewed by the Pentagon's Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (Rasor, 1982).
In theory, the above process is how the procurement process works.
However, according to Anthony R. Battista, a House Armed Service
Committee staff member, "programs are freight trains ... once they get
started, it's very hard to turn them off, even if they don't make sense" (p.
157). Why is this so? Why is it so difficult to stop a bad weapon system
from advancing to a higher level of ineffectiveness? Problems within the
following three procurement areas, in particular, contribute to this faulty
process.
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Testing

Testing is a very important part of the procurement process, for it is
here weapons are confirmed as being ready for effective use in combat
situations. There are two components of the testing period:
developmental and operational. According to 1981 testimony by Russell
Murray, former head of the Department of Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation:
The object of development testing is to find out whether a
new weapon meets its technical specifications. The object of
operational testing is to find out if the weapons - even if it
does meet specifications - will really be useful in combat.
Developmental testing is conducted by highly trained
scientists, technicians, and specialists under tightly
controlled, laboratory-like conditions. Operational testing is
conducted out in the field by run-of-the-mill servicemen
under conditions simulating wartime as closely as possible.
During developmental testing, the most abusive practice is falsifying test
results. Those who test weapons systems are under considerable pressure
to advance weapons through the system, even if they're not operating
satisfactorily. The major problem with operational testing is outright
cheating while testing the weapons, or lying once faulty results are
reported. Perhaps the best way to make one understand this type of
abuse is to highlight instances where this has occurred.
The M-1 tank case is an excellent example of lying when presenting
test results. While investigating the M-1 tank, Dina Rasor, of the Project
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of Military Procurement, discovered many deficiencies the Army was
trying to cover-up. The engine and power-train were seriously flawed and
were unable to meet the Army's own requirements. One requirement the
Army had for the M-1 was that it travel 101 miles between engine
failures. After the second round of operational testing (OT II), the Army's
own records showed the M-1 failed seriously every 34 miles. However,
after "adjusting'' the figures, the AJ:my reported the M-1 broke down every
93.97 miles - only 7 miles under their requirement.
The power-train had serious problems too. The Army requirement
was that 50 percent of the M-l's had to go 4000 miles without needing a
power-train overhaul. Once again, according to the Army's own
documents, the M-1 reached a rate of only 22 percent. When confronted
about this shortfall, the Army stated the M-1 had reached the 54 percent
requirement during OT II. The truth was, however, that the OT III test
results showed the M-1 had actually dropped to 19 percent, not increased
to 54 percent as the Army contended (Rasor, 1985).
The Maverick missile case is a good example of how "the
procurement bureaucracy is perfectly capable of fudging or downright
cheating on test results" (Rasor, 1985, p. 120). The Maverick is an air-to
ground anti-tank missile used by the A-10 assault aircraft and the F-16
fighter. It works by sending out heat images through the use of an infra-

43
red sensor in the nose of the missile. These visual images are relayed to a
five-square-inch video screen in the cockpit where the pilot is required to
differentiate between acceptable targets such as tanks, and other
unacceptable targets such as fires, smoke, burning bushes, and sun
warmed objects. Therefore, theoretically, the pilot, armed with his heat
seeking Maverick missile, should be able to single-handedly seek out and
destroy tanks or other targets. The_ Army, knowing the difficulties of
actually accomplishing this, fixed the test so as to allow for the greatest
amount of success. The first advantage that was allowed in this test was
the use of PAVE PENNY, a device which allows the pilot to see a laser
"spot" put on a target by an infantry man in the combat zone. In addition
to the help afforded to the pilots by PAVE PENNY, the pilots learned the
layout of the testing area by making numerous practice flights over it. Of
123 "captive-carry passes" (trying to electronically lock-on to targets
without actually firing), excluding practice runs, less than 60 percent of
the attempts locked-on to true targets, with the remainder not producing
lock-ons or they locked-on to false targets (Rasor, 1985).
Two years later the Air Force ran new tests on the Maverick,
attempting to show that the failures documented in the previous test had
been corrected. As before, PAVE PENNY was used to assist the pilots.
Additionally, 317 practice flights were used but not counted as part of the
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test. The Air Force counted 215 passes with only 113 resulting in lock
ons, one-third of the 113 were cued by PAVE PENNY. Therefore, only 76
of the 215 lock-ons, or 35 percent, were credited to the Maverick!
According to Rasor (1985):
[O]ne of the areas of cheating on the operational tests that I
thought was especially dishonest was allowing pilots
hundreds of dry runs over the targets to memorize them
before the first shot was fired. That might have been
acceptable in a development� test where engineers were
fine-tuning the weapons, but it was inexcusable in an
operational test because no enemy is going to allow hostile
aircraft to fly over its territory and memorize the landscape.
In fact, to truly simulate combat conditions, someone should
be assigned to think like the enemy and try all types of
evasive countermeasures to defeat the weapon. But this is
rarely done even in operational testing (p. 123)

Competition

A lack of competition is a major problem within the procurement
process. According to the Government Accounting Office, as cited by
Rasor (1985) "in 1981 only 6 percent of the Pentagon's procurement
budget was competitively bid" (p. 128). Seemingly, the government has
adopted an informal policy of awarding the more expensive sole-source
contracts instead of seeking competitive bids for weapons systems. When
a company receives a sole-source contract they are the only contractor
allowed to bid on that particular contract. This has significantly
increased the price the government pays for products that it buys from
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contractors. Additionally, this type of process has encouraged contractors
to ''buy-in" to a contract, knowing that once they receive the initial
contract all subsequently related contracts will be theirs too. According to
Rasor (1985) "obviously the contractor, knowing that all he has to do is
win the first competition, thereby capturing all the follow-on contracts,
will not be encouraged to keep costs down" (p. 128). Thus, the incentive
given to contractors is to win the ea�ly contract, even at a financial·
sacrifice, in order to reach the placid waters of the lucrative follow-on
contracts negotiated in a sole-source atmosphere" (Stubbing, 1986, p.

177).
A prime example of this is the procurement of spare parts. Once a
contractor wins a contract, he is almost guaranteed the follow-on
contracts that involve spare parts. By adding costs such as Quality
Control, Quality Assurance, Program Planning, and other costs of doing
business, the contractor is able to dramatically increase the price of the
spare parts.

Pricing

The bottom line, at least to taxpayers, is the cost of weapon
systems. In an attempt to devise a way to pay a fair price for weapons,
Ernie Fitzgerald (1989) introduced the concept of "should-cost" pricing,
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"which means we would pay only what goods and services should cost,
according to industry standards" (p. 17). The government seemingly
prefers to figure costs according to past prices paid.
In other words, they estimate how much a weapon 'will cost' based
on the price of the weapon it is replacing, plus additions for any
new innovations. As a result, an increasingly unrealistic baseline
for pricing our weapons incorporates into the system as 1egitimate
costs' any waste, fraud, and mismanagement of the previous
weapon (Rasor, 1985, p. 265).
Once a price has been artifi.dally inflated, the government relies on
the inflated price as a basis for the future price. Consequently, these
prices continually increase due to new baseline fi gu res for each
subsequent contract. Therefore, what the government pays for an item is
significantly higher than what the item is actually worth. As Fitzgerald

(1989) notes, "they [the Pentagon] never learned that any piece of goods
sold to the government ought to be priced as what it should cost to make
or require economically and efficiently, plus a moderate, decent profit" (p.

159).
Donna Martin of the Project on Military Procurement, succinctly
summarized the concept of should-cost pricing:
There are many elements that go into deriving an
appropriate should-cost formula. For example, industrial
engineers can judge the efficiency of factory labor by using
the concept of "working measurement" and calculating the
cost of what is called a "standard hour of output." A
standard hour of output is the amount of work that can be
reasonably expected to be performed by an experienced
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worker in an hour's time. It should be emphasized that the
standard hour is a measure of work output and has no
necessary relationship to time actually expended in doing a
job. It is used as a standard for comparing what should
reasonably be accomplished in an hour, versus what is
actually accomplished.
A dollar and cents charge for a standard ho_ur of output is
determined by an industrial engineering formula and those
charges may vary from task to task and contractor to
contractor. Fitzgerald and his associates have found that the
charges the government pays for the standard hour of output
for defense contracts are considerably higher than what is
charged in the private sector.· For example, Dr. Thomas
Amlie, one of Fitzgerald's deputies, ... found that companies
in the electronics field charge an average $25 to $35 per
standard hour of output. In contrast, the government pays
anywhere from $99 to $3300 to defense contractors for
comparable output ... (Rasor, 1985, 266)
The procurement process, as we can see, is seriously flawed. As
such, it's designed to perpetuate a system of, what I call, "reverse
rewards." Throughout the process, no-one is rewarded for saving money,
increasing product quality, or demonstrating efficient, ethical practices.
Instead workers, managers, government officials, Chief Executive
Officers, and Presidents (both political and private) are seemingly
rewarded for supporting an inefficient and criminalistic procurement
process. Therefore, one is rewarded (financially or through increased
power and status) for maintaining a system that is the reverse of any
logical business-like atmosphere. In other words, by reversing the norms
found within any successful business, such as efficiency, consumer
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satisfaction, and quality, with norms such as inefficiency, consumer
dissatisfaction, poor quality, and high cost, one is rewarded financially or
otherwise.
Consequently, it is through the potentially enormous rewards that
those within this system have justified their commission or omission of
actions. In our materialistic society the desire for these rewards
drastically outweighs the desire to �o what many consider to be morally
correct.

Military Industrial Complex

The military industrial complex is a vital component which
facilitates and initiates state-corporate crime in the defense industry. The
military industrial complex consists of three major institutions within
society: Congress (State), Department of Defense (State), and a
Corporation (in this analysis, General Dynamics). It is through the
intricate interactions between these three institutions that state-corporate
crimes are committed. Each of these three institutions have goals which
are dependent upon each other. Although each of these institutions are
equally important within the realm of state-corporate crime in the defense
industry, I am going to begin by discussing the DOD's role.
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The DOD's primary goal is to provide national security for the
United States. Historically this has been accomplished by using its
technologically superior weapons - such as nuclear weapons in World War
II, and smart bombs, the stealth bomber, and the patriot missiles during
Desert Storm. It is through this desire for advanced weapons systems the
DOD justifies its questionable procurement practices. This motivation for
advanced weapon systems that will allow American service people to fight
and win a war is primarily fueled by competition; competition between the
different armed services themselves, as well as the absence of significant
competition for contracts that are awarded by the military.
The DOD, like any other institution, is very competitive. The
armed forces are continually competing against each other for money,
personnel, recognition, and, most importantly, technologically advanced
weapon systems. According to Eitzen and Zinn (1992), "[e]ach of the
military services has a vested interest in maintaining and increasing its
position relative to the other. The intense rivalries among the four
services result in efforts by each to inflate its importance and demean the
worth of the others" (p. 127). It is through these inter-service
competitions that much waste and duplication is perpetuated.
The DOD also participates in another type of competitive
ineptitude. Due to the specialized nature of the products it procures
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(weapon systems), and the national security considerations which
accompany them, the DOD is able to justify (at least in their minds) the
very limited, and in many cases the total lack of, competitive bidding for
their procurement contracts. As shown earlier, the vast majority of the
military contracts are not competitively bid.
The goals and competition within the DOD allow a handful of
corporations to benefit significantly. Corporations are in business for the
sole reason of making a profit. And in the case of defense contracts,
corporations are in a unique position to make an almost guaranteed
profit. Furthermore, the way the system is structured allows for
continual follow-on contracts which prove to be very lucrative for the
contractor. Rewards such as future contracts, which are dependent upon
receiving the initial contract, put an incredible amount of pressure on
corporations to win the initial contract.
Several major contractors have managed to win these lucrative
contracts by winning the support of major political actors within the state;
more specifically within the Congress. To understand how congressmen
can be ''bought-out" by a corporation, it's important to understand that a
politicians primary objective is to be reelected. Many contend the first
item on a newly-elected politician's agenda is to work on getting reelected
for another term in office. Defense contracting corporations are in a
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unique position to help politicians attain this goal. The first way is
through financial support. The expense involved in running, and
winning, a political campaign is enormous. Therefore, by pledging
financial support to these politicians, contractors expect some type of
future "favor" in return. This favor is usually in the form of the
politicians expected vote for a weapon system that would benefit the
financially contributing corporatio�.
The second way a corporation is in a position to help politicians
reach their goals is by the massive amount of political support (through
constituents' votes) politicians receive when they support weapons
systems that bring jobs to their constituents. And, as major weapons
systems affect voters throughout the entire United States due to
subcontracts, many politicians are affected by a single contract. This
would then complete the circulatory nature of the military-industrial
complex.
As Figure 2 below shows, each institution benefits from, and
supports, each of the other two institutions. The DOD supports the
corporations by awarding lucrative contracts to them, while the
corporations support Congress by lending financial and political support
to them, and Congress supports the DOD by allowing funding for the
weapons they desire. Subsequently Congress supports the corporations

by voting for certain weapons that their "financially supportive
corporation" is bidding on, while the corporation supports the DOD by
I DOD

Awards Contracts

Votes for Weapons
Financial & Political
Support

Figure 2. Military Industrial Complex.

providing future jobs through the revolving door (this phenomenon is
discussed in more detail later), while the DOD supports Congress by
establishing domestic and worldwide power.
Although actors involved in procuring the Trident Submarine
knowingly committed illegal acts, the environment which allowed this
type of activity to occur included several different organizations: DOD,
Congress, and a Corporation (General Dynamics). Each of these
organizations equally contributed to the Trident Nuclear Submarine
fraud described in Chapter II.
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Department of Defense

Men and women who work for the DOD hold influential positions
within the most powerful military force in the world. However, due to the
structure of the military many personnel get caught in what is known as
the "revolving door." According to Rasor (1985) "this usually means that
an employee of one of the armed seryices takes a job with the defense
contractor he was overseeing while he was with the military" (p. 140).
Retired Navy engineer, Dr. Amlie, most succinctly describes the revolving
door dilemma:
The major problem with having a military officer in charge of
procurement is his vulnerability. It turns out that not
everyone can make general or admiral and our "up or out"
policy [either get promoted or you're not allowed to reenlist]
forces people to retire. The average age of an officer at
retirement is 43 years. Counting allowances, a colonel had
more take home pay than a U.S. Senator. At the age of 43 he
probably has kids in or ready for college and a big mortgage
and can't afford a large cut in his income. Besides, he is at
the peak of his intellectual powers, is emotionally involved,
and doesn't want to quit. We throw him out anyway, no
matter how good a job he is doing. Many of these officers,
particularly the good ones who have spent most of their
careers flying aircraft, operating ships, or leading troops, do
not have the skills which are readily marketable in the
civilian sector. This nice man then comes around and offers
him a job at $50,000-$75,000 per year. If he stands up and
makes a fuss about high costs and poor quality, no nice man
will come and see him when he retires. Even if he has no
interest in a post-retirement job in the defense industry, he
is taking a chance by making a fuss. The "system" will,
likely as not, discover a newly open job in Tule, Greenland;
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Adak, Alaska; or some other garden spot for which he, and
only he, is uniquely qualified. Thus, his family, as well as
his career, suffers. To their everlasting credit, many fine
officers have made a fuss anyway and suffered the
consequences (Amlie, 1983, p.144).
The revolving door process is not an overnight process. According
to the Post Dispatch (1985) "[t]here is planning involved. The process
begins at least two or three years prior to the separation from government
service, and the manager becomes s�ft on the contractor" (p. 30). This
allows the DOD employee ample time to prove him/herself to the
contractor, all the while neglecting the government's interests. As we can
see, the revolving door has serious implications for the procurement
system. From the very beginning of weapons systems development,
officials concerned about their future may purposefully neglect to
vigorously perform their duties. This allows faulty weapons systems, or
overpriced systems, to continue through the process until a faulty or
overpriced product is delivered.
The revolving door turns the other way too. Not only do
government employees (usually from the DOD) find employment within
the private sector, but private sector employees also may find employment
within the government. One such instance of a major conflict of interest
was the appointment of David Packard to spearhead the President's Blue
Ribbon Commission. According to Fitzgerald (1989):
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In naming David Packard as chairman, the administrator
couldn't have found a man better equipped with massive
conflicts of interest. The multimillionaire industrialist,
chairman of the board of Hewlett-Packard, a big defense
contractor and supplier to even bigger contractors, was also a
member of Boeing's board of directors. And, as Nixon's
deputy secretary of defense, he had managed the billion
dollar Lockheed bailout after the C5A disaster. (p. 227)
It's apparent the government, with appointments such as
Packard's, is no less guilty than private industry of keeping the revolving
door spinning. With such obvious conflicts of interest as this, the
procurement system doesn't stand a chance of improving. Consequently,
the Packard Commission was merely a public relations ploy devised to
shift negative public scrutiny away from the dismal defense procurement
system - unfortunately it worked.

Congress

The abuses are not restricted to those in the DOD. Congress, which
allocates funds to the DOD, is guilty too. Congress participates in what is
called "pork barrel spending." Pork barrel spending is when a
congressperson votes in favor of legislation that brings jobs and/or
economic improvements to his/her constituents. The legislation that we
are most concerned with here is that which brings jobs in the form of
defense contracts and subcontracts to the constituents of the
congressperson. Therefore, even if a weapon system is unnecessary,
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faulty, or overpriced, a congressperson will still vote for it if it will bring
jobs, and therefore votes, to his/her district. As Stubbing (1986) notes:
For members of Congress - whose job it is to represent the
interests of their constituents - the economic impact of the
defense budget is simply too large to ignore. The pressures
are strong for congressional representatives to ''bring home
the bacon" - by attracting new defense business or by
protecting that which is already there. Defense contractors,
in particular, are able to create strong pressures on
Congressmen and their staffs through extensive Washington
lobbying efforts. Large defense firms maintain full-time
Washington staffs of 20-80 people who seek to assess the
political atmosphere surrounding their programs and
nurture close relations with key officials in Congress as well
as the Pentagon. (p. 90)
In its simplest form, Congressmen are entrusted to '1ook-out" for
their constituents by bringing jobs and economic security to their states.
However,
[i]ronicaly, according to a study done by the Employment
Research Associates in Lansing Michigan 320 of 435
congressional districts actually pay more in taxes for this
defense than they get back in defense contracts. The states that
have more money than they pay out are a few large states such
as Virginia and California. So the pork-barrel-based defense
system is really not an economic bargain for most. (Rasor, 1985,
pp. 278-279)

Corporations

The actions taken by the above institutions are normally unethical
at most, although at times illegal too. Corporations, however, frequently
commit illegal, as well as unethical, acts in pursuit of their goals.

Although there are many instances where corporations in general commit
illegal acts, those actions committed by General Dynamics' Electric Boat
Division are under scrutiny here.
General Dynamics, like other corporations, has a primary goal of
making a profit. The problem is when the desire for a healthy profit turns
into greed, both individually and corporately. To better understand how
the desire for profit influences corpo!ate illegalities, it's important to look
at organizational pressures which may predispose both individuals and
corporations to this type of deviance.
Those who work for and/or head major corporations are under an
enormous amount of pressure. Consequently, these pressures may
encourage organizations to commit illegal acts. According to Lane (1953),
"while it is generally (but not universally) true that economic gain is
necessary for violations of the law to take place, marginal and declining
firms are more likely to violate the law than prosperous firms" (p. 164).
Employees also face pressures because they depend on the
organization for their own survival. Subsequently, these employees are
fully aware that "as people they are replaceable, interchangeable parts,
mere occupants of bureaucratic positions" (Simon and Eitzen, 1993, p.
299). Virtually powerless to fight the organization, employees follow
procedures and commit acts that they otherwise may not have committed.
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Furthermore, they are virtually required, for their own livelihood, to
participate, and even perpetuate these actions. According to Rasor (1985),
these actors "are your neighbors, uncles, or even husbands. Although
some are just plain corrupt people, the majority are pressured by the
bureaucracy to go along with the procurement system to advance their
careers or even keep their jobs" (p. 137)
These pressures are part of� corporate culture. Those who lead
major corporations, and those who are in other positions of power within
these organizations, set the example for their employees to follow.
Consequently when executives do not take steps to ensure illegal acts are
not being committed, an atmosphere of illegality may evolve. According to
Katz and Kahn (1966), organizational roles give persons within a
corporate setting expectations "which may include preferences with
respect to specific acts and personal characteristics or styles; they may
deal with what the person should do, what kind of person he should be,
what he should think, or believe, and how he should relate to others" (p.
175). Likewise, when executives initiate certain actions (through their
commission or omission) their subordinates are conditioned into
inappropriate behavior. According to the Post Dispatch (1985) "[t]he top
man has authority over promotions, bonuses, [and] transfers. And he
doesn't want any big tussles with the contractor. This translates into a
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type of cultural conditioning, and the message is clear: 'Don't rock the
boat."' Furthermore, "when your promotions and bonuses are based on
not finding anything wrong, you learn to find nothing wrong, and you
finally become conditioned to believe there is nothing wrong'' (p. 30).
With a better understanding of the procurement process and the
military industrial complex, let's explore how these two entities helped
perpetuate the crimes outlined in Ch_apter II above.
The integrated framework offered by Kauzlarich and Kramer (see
Chapter I) clearly shows how theoretical concepts can be applied to help
explain why actual events may have occurred. Specifically, the General
Dynamics corporation was clearly motivated to utilize corporate
wrongdoing as a means of achieving its goals. Its primary goal was to
make a profit for itself and its shareholders - which it accomplished.
However, the means it used were, in many cases, illegal. Time and time
again the U.S. Justice Department brought charges against the General
Dynamics corporation for illegal acts they committed. This pattern of
behavior clearly shows the company's motivation to use corporate
wrongdoing as a means of achieving its goals.
The opportunity for the General Dynamics corporation to commit
these crimes has always been available. The process itself is not designed
to prevent fraud. The lack of "should-cost" pricing and competitive bidding
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are just two examples of areas within the procurement system that
facilitate state-corporate crimes within the defense industry.
An "absence or weakness of social control mechanism[s]" is clearly
evident too. Just as many times as the Justice Department brought
charges against the General Dynamics corporation, charges were dropped.
Additionally, on several occasions the Department of Defense threatened
to deny future contracts to the Gene!al Dynamics Corporation, only to
grant the contracts in due time.
By using an integrated framework, it is easy to see how these
crimes were committed. The corporation was motivated to break the law;
there were always ample opportunities to commit these crimes; and the
social control mechanisms to prevent these crimes were either lacking or
nonexistent.

CHAPTERIV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this thesis I examined government documents, and
researched books, periodicals, transcripts, and journalistic reports which
described the many instances of state-corporate crime found within the
defense industry.
At the core of this type of crime is the military industrial complex.
This organization features three very powerful entities (Congress, the
Department of Defense, and a Corporation) responsible for facilitating
and initiating the crimes found within this industry.
The General Dynamics Corporation was the focus of this thesis. I
described the relationship the General Dynamics Corporation had with
the Department of Defense (specifically the Navy) and with the Congress.
Through a thorough analysis of available documentation, I was able to
show that state-corporate crimes were committed within the defense
industry. Just as importantly, I was able to show how commission of
these crimes was facilitated by describing the procurement process
utilized within the defense industry. By using a system designed to
decrease cost savings, while simultaneously increasing corporate profits,
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General Dynamics was able to defraud U.S. taxpayers of millions of
dollars.

Policy Recommendations

Prevention of activities such as those that General Dynamics
participated in, is possible. It's my contention that, in a perfect world, the
laws already in existence would be capable of controlling state-corporate
crime in the defense industry. Unfortunately, the agencies involved
operate above the law. Congressmen, DOD officials, and corporate
officers are all part of a corrupt environment. Regardless of known
transgressions, violators are able to rely on those in positions of power
within the government to exonerate them. In turn, those within the
political realm benefit through kickbacks, or increased political support
by the corporations that s/he exonerated. The system, therefore, is
circular and never-ending because it feeds upon itself.
Because we don't live in a perfect world it is necessary to reform the
procurement system, as well as initiate minor punishment reforms. The
first policy that needs to be implemented is "should-cost" pricing. By
using "should-cost" pricing corporations would no longer be able to charge
outrageous prices for their products. This would also lessen individual
desire for committing fraudulent activities because the enormous benefit,
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in relation to the risk, would be substantially lowered. Also, this would
make the bidding process more conducive to fair practices because the
government could calculate the cost of programs as they progress. This
would allow government auditors to substantiate accusations of fraud at
any point during the life of the contract, and would virtually force
contractors to operate legally.
In conjunction with "should-c�st" pricing, competitive bidding must
be, without exception, mandated by law. As cited earlier, only six percent
of government contracts were competitively bid in 1981. The lack of
competitive bidding considerably inflates prices. A prime example of how
competitive bidding lowers the prices of weapons systems was the RIM
66-A missile. According to Rasor (1985) this missile "cost $149,766 in
1970 dollars when it was purchased sole-source ... from General
Dynamics. GD reduced its price to $61,039 per missile - a price reduction
of 59 percent after the Navy opened up the contract for competition" (p.
129). Admittedly this reduction could have been General Dynamics' way
of simply ''buying-in" to the contract. However, the "should-cost" pricing
mentioned above would be a mechanism for controlling such possible
abuses.
Educating the public might be a viable option too. By educating
them regarding the terrible effects of "pork barrel spending'', they might
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be persuaded to look at the long-term problems of supporting politicians
who vote for unnecessary weapons systems. If this could be accomplished,
it is possible the constituents would not vote for these types of politicians,
which would be a start in correcting the many problems within the
procurement process.
An additional reform that must be implemented is closing the
revolving door. Too often employees_of the government, after retirement,
go to work for a contractor that s/he was previously overseeing. This is
totally unacceptable. As noted earlier, the process of the revolving door
normally begins two or three years before the government employee
retires. Therefore, as a sort of probation period, the contractor tests the
loyalty of the employee while the corporation commits illegal acts.
Consequently, for several years a corporation is able to defraud the
government of millions of dollars, and is able to pass off faulty weapons as
quality products. In an attempt to end this process, a law should be
passed which prevents any government employee from working for a
contractor that s/he, at any time, supervised. This would not only
eliminate most of the corruption that accompanies the revolving door, but
would also eliminate the perception of any illegal activities. Consequently,
the elimination of this perception would substantially increase morale of
government workers.
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Warranties against defects in weapons purchases should be
considered. As Dina Rasor (1985) explains, "Warranties on cars, toasters,
and televisions protect us from defective products. Shouldn't our soldiers
expect the same protection from weapons that they are expected to trust
their lives to?" (p. 125). By ensuring quality products are delivered by
contractors, much of the waste within the procurement system would be
eliminated. Warranties would ensur� contractors deliver a better product,
thereby reducing the many expensive fixes to weapons failures.
According to former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Thayer, "military
contractors increase prices 10% to 30% to cover products that have to be
remade because they are made improperly the first time." (Rasor, 1985, p.
127). A "warranty law" could, therefore, reduce costs by ten to thirty
percent.
Changing the standard of proof from ''beyond a reasonable doubt"
to "a preponderance of the evidence" when prosecuting state-corporate
crimes would improve the procurement process significantly. This would
lessen the strictness of the law, therefore making it somewhat easier for
agents of the law to prosecute their cases. As a justification for this
improvement, it should be noted that because of the power and secrecy of
the corporations a change such as this is necessary. Additionally, the
safeguard of ''beyond a reasonable doubt" was originally written so as to

protect ordinary powerless citizens from the abusive, overintrusive power
of government. Therefore corporations, who are as powerful (if not more
so) as the government, do not need to be afforded the strictness of this
safeguard.
A simple improvement of the existing system would be to merely
stick to the punishments that are levied. Repeatedly, General Dynamics
had its suspensions lifted and had c�ntracts returned which had
previously been given to other contractors. By refusing to enforce its
decisions, the government repeatedly sent a message to General
Dynamics, and other corporations as well, that their actions were
acceptable and that they need not worry about any significant penalty.
Another suggestion for improvement relates solely with
punishment after conviction. As designed, this punishment system
compares existing criminal punishments of "street crimes" to punishments
designed for "suite crimes." It's my contention criminalistic corporations
are derived from the top down. By this I mean that those who have the
power within a corporation allow, perpetuate, facilitate, and even initiate
criminal activities within their corporation. Therefore, as those with the
power within a corporation are the only individuals able to prevent
criminal activities, I contend illegal activities will persist until those in
power realize their actions are not going to go unpunished, and the
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corporation will directly suffer the consequences of their bad actions. This
approach would, in my opinion, awaken the shareholders that if the
corporation does not change its ways, it will no longer make a profit and
may eventually go bankrupt.
With this in mind I offer a punishment system that reprimands the
corporation financially, as well as individual decision makers by
prosecuting each specific actor possible within a criminal court. The
criminal prosecution would not differ from what is currently being
accomplished, with the exception of the change to a preponderance of
evidence as mentioned earlier. The major improvement is how
punishments are levied. My basic premise is that for the severity of the
offenses committed by a corporation, the severity of the punishment
would increase too. This parallels the criminal law in that as the severity
of an individual's crime increases, so too does his/her punishment.
Therefore, I propose certain punishments be written into law for
prosecutions of corporations as individual entities. The formula would be
calculated by linking a particular transgression of a corporation to that of
a crime within the criminal law, and subsequently the punishment would
correlate too.
As an example, let's consider the crime of assault. If a person is
convicted of simple assault s/he can generally be expected to serve up to

90 days in jail. Aggravated assault, which is one step up the ladder of
severity, generally calls for a person, once convicted, to be incarcerated
between 91 days to 2 years. And increasing in severity, felonious assault
normally carries a sentence of between 1 and 5 years. I believe it could be
advantageous to implement the same type of punishments to corporations,
but by punishing them financially. However, to do this we have to
construct a structured system of pu�ishment for these corporations. This
I have done by taking the percentage of one's lifespan that an individual
loses when s/he is punished after committing a crime, and constructed a
similar percentage of financial punishment that should be levied upon
corporations that are convicted of illegal activities. By using the simple
assault figures given above, I calculated that an individual loses (if
serving the entire sentence) approximately 1.0 percent of his/her life while
incarcerated (assuming the average life of an individual as 72 years). An
individual who is convicted of aggravated assault would lose 1.03 percent
of his/her life while incarcerated. While an individual convicted of
felonious assault would lose 1.07 percent of his/her life while incarcerated.
I contend that a corporation could also be punished similarly. After
establishing which state-corporate crimes are going to be compared to
which street crimes, we can then impose financial punishments upon
corporations. Therefore, if convicted of giving gratuities to government
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officials (and assuming giving gratuities could be compared to simple
assault), a corporation would have to pay 1.0 percent of their gross worth.
The fine that would have to be paid for a company that is worth 1 billion
dollars, $10 million, would be rather significant. Likewise, if a
corporation was convicted of murder it would be sentenced to death by
revoking the corporation's license. This sentence would compare to an
individual being sentenced to death if s/he murdered someone. Although
this system seems rather harsh, I believe it would alleviate many bad acts
by corporations because shareholders would not tolerate it if the top
executive put their corporation at risk.
As a final suggestion for improvement, structural change at the
broadest level may be necessary. The major agencies involved within the
Military-Industrial-Complex (Congress, the DOD, and General Dynamics)
are so deeply institutionalized into the very fabric of American society it is
virtually impossible to initiate any credible change without initiating a
full-scale overhaul of the current system.
The procurement process is undoubtedly in need of a major
restructuring. Filled with corruption, however, it seems unlikely business
as usual can be changed. Only when our society is educated about the
detrimental effects of this enormously inefficient process may we as a
nation possibly see this system improve to one of prosperity.

69

70
Although the policy recommendations outlined above are idealistic,
systematic changes such as these would be necessary before any real
improvements could be realized.

Limitations of This Thesis

Although this thesis clearly outlined corporate wrongdoing within
the defense industry, there were li�itations. Specifically, I was unable to
compare this case study with a similar case, thereby showing how two
separate phenomena are related. However, the fraudulent activities of
General Dynamics was overwhelmingly documented, I was able to
generally describe how crimes in the defense industry are conducted.
Another limitation of this case study is the incredible power and
secrecy of the actors within the military industrial complex. None of the
actors voluntarily offer incriminating evidence about themselves or their
activities. Therefore, we must rely on "whistle-blowers" and independent
journalistic and scholarly works for information about this type of
behavior.

Future Research Considerations

Clearly more research on this topic is warranted. The vast amount
of taxpayer money being wasted each year due to state-corporate crime in

the defense industry is reason enough to continue research in this area.
Future research should focus on this waste and ways to eliminate it.
Furthermore, future research should more closely scrutinize how well
newly-manufactured weapons systems work. Finally, future research
should more closely address how the military industrial complex may be
spreading to other countries throughout the world. As the U.S. economy
becomes increasing dependent upon global partnerships, it is reasonable
to believe that U.S. corporations operating outside the United States may
develop partnerships with state and military entities from other
countries. This would make the definition of the military industrial
complex more inclusive so as to include Departments of Defense and state
involvement from other countries.
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